

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PETER OPPENEER
CLERK US DIST COURT
WD OF WI

v.

INDICTMENT

CLEMENT ONUAMA, and
OREFO OKEKE,

Case No. 17-CR-111-WMC

Defendants.

18 U.S.C. § 371
18 U.S.C. § 1343
18 U.S.C. § 1028A
18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C)
18 U.S.C. § 982
28 U.S.C. § 2461(c)

THE GRAND JURY CHARGES:

COUNT 1

Background

1. At times material to this conspiracy:
 - a. Clement Onuama was a citizen from Nigeria, who operated an auto repair business known as Destiny Auto Repair at 2621 Skyway Drive, Grand Prairie, Texas, according to his 2010-2015 income tax returns. The names of businesses utilized by the defendants at that location included: Destiny Auto Repair, Sysco Serve, D&D Serv, Inc., Destiny Oil Change and Lube, Destiny Oil Change and Lube Auto Repair, Daniel Destiny and Auto Repairs, Inc., Clem and Sysco Services, LLC, and The Lord is My Shepard Trucking Companies.
 - b. Orefo Okeke was a citizen from Nigeria, who operated an auto sales business known as Sysco Serve at 2621 Skyway Drive, Grand Prairie, Texas and at

1326 West Main Street, Grand Prairie, Texas, according to his 2015 and 2016 income tax returns.

c. On April 27, 2014, Onuama and Okeke created a domestic limited liability company named Clem & Sysco Services, LLC. The records listed both Clement Onuama and Sylvanus Orefo Okeke as managers of the company that is located at 2621 Skyway Drive, Grand Prairie, Texas 75052.

d. On October 8, 2014, a certificate of filing was received by the Secretary of State of Texas creating the Domestic For-Profit Corporation named D & D Serv, Inc. The records indicated that the registered office of the corporation was located at 2621 Skyway Drive, Grand Prairie, Texas 75052. The records indicated that Clement Onuama was the registered agent.

e. On February 6, 2017 a certificate of filing was received by the Secretary of State of Texas creating the Domestic For-Profit Corporation named Sysco Serve LLC. The records indicated that the registered office of the corporation was located at 1326 West Main Street, Grand Prairie, Texas 75050. The records indicated that Orefo S. Okeke was the registered agent.

f. The website www.syscoserve.com indicated that "Sysco Serve" was a premium car dealer that opened fifteen years ago in Grand Prairie, Texas. Sylvan Okeke was listed as the CEO and founder of the business. The website invited customers to visit their business and try out their enormous inventory of premium cars. The website listed the business address as "Sysco Serve, 1326 W. Main Street, Grand Prairie, Texas 75050."

g. Square, Inc. records indicated that a Square, Inc. account was opened for Sysco Serve during 2015. A review of the Square, Inc. account information indicated that the business was located at 2621 Skyway Drive, Grand Prairie, Texas; the business sold used cars, detailed cars, waxed cars, polished headlights, and offered complete car care services. A photograph of a Sysco Serve advertisement was linked to the account and an IRS Form W-9 in the name of Orefo Okeke at 2621 Skyway Drive, Grand Prairie, Texas was linked to the account. The advertisement linked to the Square Inc. account also included information for Clement Onuama's business located at 2621 Skyway Drive, Grand Prairie, Texas.

h. Clement Onuama maintained bank accounts at the following banks: Wells Fargo, JP Morgan Chase, BBVA Compass Bank, Comerica, Texas Trust Credit Union, Bank of America, Woodforest National Bank, Capital One Bank, and Herring Bank. Onuama had these bank accounts in the following names: Clement C. Onuama dba Destiny Auto Repair, D&D Serv, Destiny Auto Repair, Clement Onuama dba D&D Serv, Clement Onuama Sole Prop dba D&D Serv, and D&D Serv, Inc.

i. Orefo Okeke maintained bank accounts at the following banks: Wells Fargo, Capital One Bank, Regions Bank, JP Morgan Chase, Woodforest Bank, and Herring Bank. Okeke had these bank accounts in the following names: Orefo S. Okeke, Orefo S. Okeke dba Sysco Serve, Sysco Serve (Orefo S. Okeke), Orefo Sylvanus Okeke dba Sysco Serv, Orefo Okeke dba Sysco Serv, and Orefo S. Okeke Sysco Serv.

Conspiracy

2. From in or about 2010 to in or about December 2016, in the Western District of Wisconsin, and elsewhere, the defendants,

CLEMENT ONUAMA and
OREFO OKEKE,

knowingly conspired with each other, and other persons known and unknown to the grand jury, to commit and cause to be committed, offenses against the United States, namely:

- a. wire fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343; and
- b. money laundering, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1957.

Manner and Means

The manner and means by which the conspiracy was sought to be accomplished included, among others, the following:

3. It was part of the conspiracy that the defendants engaged in a variety of fraud schemes using wires. These various fraud schemes included the following:

- a. Romance fraud schemes – Onuama and Okeke received proceeds from schemes that involved several victims who believed that they were in romantic relationships with persons that they met through online dating websites. These relationships evolved through conversations on email, chat apps, and telephone conversations. Eventually the person that posed as the victim's online partner asked

each victim for financial assistance. They told the victims that they needed funds in order to release a much larger amount of money that was frozen by a foreign country. At the direction of the online partner, the victims wired or sent funds as directed by their online partner to bank accounts that were controlled by Onuama and Okeke. In some instances, when the victim resisted sending more money, the victim received phone calls from persons purporting to be acting on behalf of the victim's online romantic partner, urging the victim to make the requested wire transfer.

b. Business email compromise schemes/identity theft – Onuama and Okeke received proceeds from schemes that involved several victims who received fraudulent wire instructions through email messages that appeared to be for legitimate business purposes. Each of the victims received “spoofed” email messages that appeared to be from a fellow employee or business associate instructing them to wire funds to various accounts controlled by the defendants. Several victims replied to the original email message to verify the wire instructions and received a confirming email from the purported employee or associate. Per the instructions of the spoofed email, the victims initiated wire transfers to bank accounts held by Onuama and Okeke. In some instances, the spoofed emails included fictitious documents, like invoices or signed wiring authorization forms.

c. Account takeover schemes/identity theft – Onuama and Okeke received proceeds from schemes that involved several victims whose financial accounts were accessed by unauthorized individuals. Each of the victims' accounts were

accessed by unauthorized individuals and funds were wired or checks drawn on the victims' accounts and then deposited into accounts held by Onuama and Okeke.

d. Credit card fraud schemes/identity theft – Onuama received proceeds from schemes that involved several victims who had unauthorized credit card accounts opened in their names without their permission. The victims were unaware of the credit card accounts until they received the credit card bills. Each of the unauthorized credit card accounts had fake transactions that were charged by Destiny Auto Repair with payments going to a bank account held by Onuama.

4. It was further part of the conspiracy that when confronted by various banks regarding possible fraudulent deposits into their accounts, the defendants lied to the bankers and falsely told them the money came from clients who were engaged in automobile purchases and sales with the defendants. When asked by the bankers for documentation to prove the validity of the automobile transactions, the defendants either said they had no such documentation, or that they did have the documentation, but never provided it to the bankers.

5. It was further part of the conspiracy that the proceeds resulting from the fraud schemes were concealed by the defendants by moving them through nominee bank accounts. Once the fraud proceeds were deposited into the defendants' bank accounts, they attempted to drain the accounts by withdrawing the proceeds in structured cash increments of \$10,000 or less. In a further effort to conceal their receipt of the fraud proceeds, Onuama and Okeke failed to report any of the fraud proceeds on their tax returns, or pay income taxes on this illegal income.

6. It was further part of the conspiracy that once the fraud proceeds were deposited into the defendants' bank accounts, they issued cashier's checks to each other or to third parties, or transferred the proceeds to each other, in increments over \$10,000.

7. It was further part of the conspiracy that the defendants caused an attempted fraud loss amount in excess of \$3,200,000, and an actual fraud loss amount in excess of \$2,600,000.

Overt Acts

In furtherance of the conspiracy, and to accomplish its objectives, the following overt acts were committed in the Western District, and elsewhere:

[FWR]

8. On or about February 19, 2014, at 10:02 a.m., T.O., a realtor in Madison, Wisconsin, received a fraudulent email sent to his "gmail" email account, from a person purporting to be S.S. using the email address of sxxxx@title-pros.com. An attachment to the fraudulent email contained a letter purporting to be from Portage County Title, on Portage County Title letterhead, which gave materially false wiring instructions.

9. On or about February 24, 2014, at 9:08 a.m., T.O. received a fraudulent email, again purporting to be from S.S. using the email address of sxxxx@title-pros.com. The email confirmed the false wiring instructions sent on February 19, 2014.

[YB Cosmedical, Inc.]

10. On or about February 12, 2014, YB Cosmedical, Inc. in South Korea, received an email purportedly from C.L. who worked at one of YB's vendors (Chemolee Lab Corp. in Irving, Texas). The fraudulent email from C.L. used the email address of:

cxxlmm@chemolee.com asking YB to pay its outstanding balance of \$18,000 to Chemolee Lab, but to send the money to a new bank account because of an "annual audit." The new bank account was to account #xxxx-4015 for D&D Serv at BBVA Compass Bank in Arlington, Texas.

11. On or about March 26, 2014, YB Cosmedical Inc. wire transferred \$18,000 from its account at the International Bank of Korea to BBVA Compass Bank in Arlington, Texas. After fees, \$17,980 was deposited into bank account #xxx-4015 for D&D Serv.

12. On March 28, 2014, defendant Onuama purchased a cashier's check for \$10,000 from account #xxx-4015, payable to defendant Orefo Okeke. On that same day, defendant Onuama withdrew \$5,000 in cash from account #xxx-4015.

13. On March 29, 2014, a banker from BBVA Compass Bank contacted defendant Onuama and asked him about the nature of the \$17,980 wire transfer from YB Cosmedical into account #xxx-4015. Defendant Onuama falsely told the banker the money was for a vehicle purchase from Onuama. When asked to provide documents for the vehicle sale, Onuama told the banker there were no documents.

[A.S. Trust]

14. On or about May 19, 2014, T.S. received an email purportedly from his trust client (A.S.) who lived in Geneva, Switzerland. The person pretending to be A.S. asked T.S. to wire transfer \$16,300 for the purchase of some art. T.S. replied to the email requesting confirmation from A.S., and he received a reply confirming the request and

saying they will repay it next week. T.S. then wired \$16,300 from A.S's. trust account to Comerica Bank account #xxx-3668 for D&D Serv.

15. On or about May 20-21, 2014, defendant Onuama made two cash withdrawals (one for \$3,500 and the other for \$2,000) from the D&D Serv. account #xxx-3668.

[Ocean Grove Development]

16. On or about November 30, 2015, A.H. received an email purportedly from her boss, N.K., at Ocean Grove Development in St. Kitts, West Indies, asking A.H. to pay the attached invoice by wiring the money per the instructions on the invoice. Attached to the fraudulent email was an invoice from D&D Serv, 2621 Skyway Dr. Grand Prairie, Texas in the amount of \$84,100 requesting payment for "VxWorks Proll (Development/Installation/Maintenance)." The invoice had wire instructions for payment to Capital One Bank account #xxx-8232 in the name of D&D Serv. On that same day, A.H. initiated the wire transfer, per the instructions in the invoice.

17. On or about November 30, 2015, defendant Onuama withdrew \$15,705.17 from D&D Serv. account #xxx-8232. When asked by a Capital One banker about the nature of the deposit from Ocean Grove Development, Onuama lied to the banker and said the funds were for the purchase of an automobile.

[TD Ameritrade]

18. On or about June 29, 2015, a TD Ameritrade account advisor (B.V.) received an email purportedly from his client (D.Y.), asking the advisor to wire \$22,000, to Regions Bank account #xxx-6870 for the benefit of Sysco Serve. B.V. attempted to call

D.Y. to confirm the email, but D.Y. was on an overseas vacation and unavailable. B.V. initiated the wire transfer per the instructions in the email.

19. On or about July 1, 2015, defendant Okeke transferred \$15,000 from the Sysco Serve account #xxx-6870 at Regions Bank, to account #xxx-6542 in the name of D&D Serv. On that same day, defendant Onuama withdrew \$15,000 in cash from account #xxx-6542.

20. On or about August 3, 2015, a banker from Regions Bank met with defendant Okeke and asked him about the nature of the \$22,000 deposit into the Sysco Serv account. Defendant Okeke lied to the banker and said the \$22,000 came from "Felix" who lived in Canada and who asked Okeke to use the money to buy a Nissan Infinity FX35 for Felix. When asked for documentation of this car purchase, Okeke said there was no documentation.

(All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371).

COUNTS 2-7

Background

1. At times material to this indictment:

a. FWR was a real estate services business headquartered in Madison, Wisconsin, with over 70 office locations, and nearly 1200 real estate professionals serving Wisconsin clients.

b. T.O. started work as a real estate agent with FWR in the Madison office in 2014. T.O. used the email address of: txxxx.oxxxx@gmail.com for his real estate work. Starting in January 2014, T.O. was involved in the purchase of a home in

Deerfield, Wisconsin. With the help of T.O., his clients made an offer to purchase the home for \$127,000. The offer was accepted on January 22, 2014, and closing set for February 25, 2014 at Portage County Title, LLC.

c. Dynasty Holdings operated as a money lending business in Chicago, Illinois. A.Y. owned and operated Dynasty Holdings. A.Y. agreed to provide financing to T.O.'s clients to buy the home located in Deerfield, Wisconsin.

d. Portage County Title (PCT) operated as a real estate title company headquartered in Stevens Point, Wisconsin. PCT offered various real estate services, including home closings. S.S. worked as a closing assistant at PCT, and was assigned to handle the closing for the Deerfield, Wisconsin home. S.S. used the work email address of: sxxxx@title-pros.com. Part of the closing process by PCT involved sending wire transfer instructions to the real estate agent to send to the lender on where to wire the purchase proceeds. PCT used a trust account at BMO Harris Bank in Chicago, Illinois to handle the financial transactions involved in home closings. Legitimate emails from S.S. at Portage County Title utilized the server pct.title-pros.com with IP address 71.13.196.34.

e. T.J.H. was a single female who lived in Iowa. T.J.H. maintained a bank account (account # xxx-9492) at Wells Fargo Bank. T.J.H. used the online dating site www.zoosk.com. In November or December 2013, T.J.H. met someone online who used the name Brian Ward, and who claimed to be an architect from Minneapolis, Minnesota. In January 2014, Ward asked T.J.H. for her personal identity information, including her online bank account information, which she provided to Ward. Ward

told T.J.H. he would be depositing money into her Wells Fargo bank account. In February 2014, T.J.H. received a large wire transfer deposit into her bank account. Ward asked T.J.H. to wire transfer this money from her bank account to two other bank accounts, one of which was for \$80,000 to a Wells Fargo account in the name of Clement Onuama, whom T.J.H. assumed was Ward's friend. T.J.H. made the wire transfers per Ward's instructions.

f. Email "spoofing" is the forgery of an email header so that the message appears to have originated from someone other than the actual source. Email spoofing is a tactic used in phishing and spam campaigns to get recipients to open an email they think has been sent by a legitimate source.

Scheme To Defraud

2. During the period beginning on or about January 2014, and continuing to on or about February 27, 2014, in the Western District of Wisconsin and elsewhere, the defendants,

CLEMENT ONUAMA and
OREFO OKEKE,

knowingly, and with the intent to defraud, devised and participated in a scheme to defraud real estate agent T.O., FWR, Dynasty Holdings, and PCT, and to obtain money and property by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, and by concealment of material facts.

3. It was part of the scheme to defraud that the defendants caused a fraudulent email to be sent on February 19, 2014, at 10:02 a.m., in response to legitimate emails between S.S. and T.O., more specifically:

a. On February 17, 2014, a legitimate email from S.S. at PCT, using the email address of sxxxx@title-pros.com was sent to T.O. at FWR informing T.O. of the wiring instructions for the purchase proceeds. T.O. was told to have the lender wire the purchase proceeds to a PCT trust account at BMO Harris Bank.

b. T.O. responded to this email on February 19, 2014 at 9:07 a.m., asking S.S. to confirm these were the correct wiring instructions.

c. On February 19, 2014, at 10:02 a.m., a fraudulent email purporting to be from S.S. at the email address of sxxxx@title-pros.com, replied to T.O. telling him she had sent him updated wire instructions a few days ago. The email header information visible to T.O. indicated that the email came from S.S. at the email address of sxxxx@title-pros.com. Attached to this fraudulent email was a letter purporting to be from PCT, on PCT letterhead, which gave materially false wiring instructions that the purchase proceeds be wired to a bank account at Wells Fargo Bank in Iowa in the name of T.J.H. This was a spoofed email. The email actually came from the email address of sxxxx.title-pros@outlook.com with an IP of 162.144.88.87, and a server for that IP address located at server.dubaifirsthome.com.

4. It was further part of the scheme to defraud that the defendants caused the following second fraudulent email to be sent on February 24, 2014, at 9:08 a.m., in response to legitimate emails between S.S. and T.O., more specifically:

a. On February 24, 2014, T.O. sent a legitimate email to S.S. informing her that the wire for the purchase proceeds would go out at 9:00 a.m. the next day. T.O. asked S.S. to confirm that the monies should be wired to the Wells Fargo account in Iowa.

b. On February 24, 2014, at 9:08 a.m., T.O. received a fraudulent email purporting to be from S.S. using the email address of sxxxx@title-pros.com. The email falsely responded "Yes!! TJ Hxxxx Wells Fargo." This was a spoofed email. The email actually came from the email address of sxxxx.title-pros@outlook.com with an IP of 64.32.14.162, and a server for that IP address located at web1.sh3lls.net.

c. Based upon the fraudulent February 19, 2014 email with the false wiring instructions, T.O. forwarded new wiring instructions to A.Y. at Dynasty Holdings. A.Y. asked for confirmation of these wiring instructions from T.O., which T.O. did on February 24, 2014. Based upon the fraudulent confirmation email to T.O. on February 24, 2014, Dynasty Holdings wired \$123,747.54 to the Wells Fargo account for T.J.H. on February 24, 2014.

5. It was further part of the scheme to defraud that the defendants caused the following series of emails containing materially false statements to be sent to T.O. on the morning of the closing, when T.O. called S.S. at PCT and learned that PCT never received the purchase funds from Dynasty Holdings into the PCT trust account at BMO Harris:

a. On February 25, 2014 at 6:47 a.m., T.O. received an email purported to be from S.S. using email address sxxxx@title-pros.com that responded "wire has

reflected in the account but is not yet available and will only clear on the 27th.” This was a spoofed email. The email actually came from the email address of sxxxx.title-pros@outlook.com with an IP of 64.32.14.162, and a server for that IP address located at web1.sh3lls.net.

b. On February 25, 2014 at 7:48 a.m., T.O. received an email purported to be from S.S. using email address sxxxx@title-pros.com that responded “that’s what the bank says but I will check later this morning.” This was a spoofed email. The email actually came from the email address of sxxxx.title-pros@outlook.com with an IP of 64.32.14.162, and a server for that IP address located at web1.sh3lls.net.

c. On February 25, 2014 at 7:53 a.m., T.O. received an email purported to be from S.S. using email address sxxxx@title-pros.com that responded “Oh! The money has cleared, Its been received, I will keep you posted.” This was a spoofed email. The email actually came from the email address of sxxxx.title-pros@outlook.com with an IP of 64.32.14.162, and a server for that IP address located at web1.sh3lls.net.

d. On February 25, 2014 at 8:16 a.m., T.O. received an email purported to be from S.S. using email address sxxxx@title-pros.com that responded “wire has been confirmed!!!!” This was a spoofed email. The email actually came from the email address of sxxxx.title-pros@outlook.com with an IP of 64.32.14.162, and a server for that IP address located at web1.sh3lls.net.

6. It was further part of the scheme to defraud that on February 24, 2014, the defendants caused a wire transfer from T.J.H.’s Wells Fargo bank account in the amount of \$80,000.00 to Wells Fargo bank account #xxx-6411 held by defendant Onuama. On

that same day, defendant Onuama withdrew cash in the amount of \$10,000.00 from his Wells Fargo bank account #xxx-6411. Also, on that same day, defendant Okeke made two cash deposits (one for \$3,500 and the other for \$6,700) into Okeke's Wells Fargo bank account.

7. It was further part of the scheme to defraud that on February 27, 2014, defendant Onuama contacted Wells Fargo bank to complain about his debit card not working for account #xxx-6411. The banker told Onuama the account was frozen due to the suspicious nature of an \$80,000 deposit. Onuama lied to the banker and told her the \$80,000 came from a woman who asked him to buy cars on her behalf and then to ship the cars to Nigeria. When the banker told Onuama the \$80,000 wire transaction appeared fraudulent, and asked Onuama to authorize the return of these funds from his bank account, Onuama refused to authorize the return of the funds.

8. It was further part of the scheme to defraud that the defendants caused Dynasty Holdings to incur a loss of \$123,747.54.

Wires

9. On or about the dates listed below, in the Western District of Wisconsin and elsewhere, the defendants,

CLEMENT ONUAMA and
OREFO OKEKE,

for the purpose of executing this scheme, knowingly caused to be transmitted, by means of wire communication in interstate commerce, the signals and writings described below for each count:

COUNT	DATE	NATURE OF WIRE COMMUNICATION
2	February 19, 2014, at 10:02 a.m.	Email to T.O. in Madison, Wisconsin at txxx.oxxx@gmail.com purportedly from S.S. at sxxxx@title-pros.com. regarding new wire transfer instructions.
3	February 24, 2014, at 9:08 a.m.	Email to T.O. in Madison, Wisconsin at txxx.oxxx@gmail.com purportedly from S.S. at sxxxx@title-pros.com. confirming the new wire transfer instructions.
4	February 25, 2014, at 6:47 a.m.	Email to T.O. in Madison, Wisconsin at txxx.oxxx@gmail.com purportedly from S.S. at sxxxx@title-pros.com. regarding the status of the wire transfer.
5	February 25, 2014, at 7:48 a.m.	Email to T.O. in Madison, Wisconsin at txxx.oxxx@gmail.com purportedly from S.S. at sxxxx@title-pros.com. regarding the status of the wire transfer.
6	February 25, 2014, at 7:53 a.m.	Email to T.O. in Madison, Wisconsin at txxx.oxxx@gmail.com purportedly from S.S. at sxxxx@title-pros.com. regarding the status of the wire transfer.
7	February 25, 2014, at 8:16 a.m.	Email to T.O. in Madison, Wisconsin at txxx.oxxx@gmail.com purportedly from S.S. at sxxxx@title-pros.com. regarding the status of the wire transfer.

(All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1343 and 2).

COUNTS 8-10

On or about the dates listed below, in the Western District of Wisconsin and elsewhere, the defendants,

CLEMENT ONUAMA and
OREFO OKEKE,

knowingly used without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person, specifically the name and email address of a real individual, during and in relation to a felony violation enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c), that is: wire fraud as alleged in

Counts 2-7 above, knowing that the means of the identification belonged to another actual person:

COUNT	DATE	NATURE OF IDENTITY THEFT
8	2-19-14	Defendants caused the name and email address of S.S. to be used in a fraudulent email sent to T.O. in Madison, Wisconsin, without the permission of S.S.
9	2-24-14	Defendants caused the name and email address of S.S. to be used in a fraudulent email sent to T.O. in Madison, Wisconsin, without the permission of S.S.
10	2-25-14	Defendants caused the name and email address of S.S. to be used in four fraudulent emails sent to T.O. in Madison, Wisconsin, without the permission of S.S.

(In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1028A(a)(1) and 2).

FORFEITURE ALLEGATION

1. Upon conviction of one or more of the offenses alleged in Counts 1 through 7 of this indictment, the defendants,

CLEMENT ONUAMA and
OREFO OKEKE,

shall forfeit to the United States, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), 982, and 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c), any property constituting or derived from proceeds obtained directly or indirectly as a result of the said violations, including but not limited to the following:

a. Money Judgment – a sum of money equal to \$2,678,328 in United States currency, representing the amount of proceeds obtained as a result of a conviction on Count 1.

b. Money Judgment – a sum of money equal to \$123,747.54 in United States currency, representing the amount of proceeds obtained as a result of a conviction on Counts 2-7.

2. If any of the above-described forfeitable property, as a result of any act or omission of the defendant --

- (a) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence,
- (b) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party,
- (c) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court,
- (d) has been substantially diminished in value, or
- (e) has been commingled with other property which cannot be


subdivided without difficulty, it is the intent of the United States, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(b)(1), to seek forfeiture of any other property of the defendant up to the value of the property described above in paragraph 1.

(In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 981(a)(1)(C), 982 and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c)).

A TRUE BILL



PRESIDING JUROR



JEFFREY M. ANDERSON
Acting United States Attorney

Indictment returned: ✓ 11-15-17